获利的

Interestingly, corporate managers have no trouble understanding that point when they are focusing on a business they operate: A parent company that owns a subsidiary with superb long-term economics is not likely to sell that entity regardless of price."Why," the CEO would ask,"should I part with my crown jewel?" Yet that same CEO, when it comes to running his personal investment portfolio, will offhandedly - and even impetuously - move from business to business when presented with no more than superficial arguments by his broker for doing so. The worst of these is perhaps,"You can't go broke taking a profit." Can you imagine a CEO using this line to urge his board to sell a star subsidiary? In our view, what makes sense in business also makes sense in stocks: An investor should ordinarily hold a small piece of an outstanding business with the same tenacity that an owner would exhibit if he owned all of that business.

有趣的是企业经理人在认定何者才是自己本业时，从来就不会搞不清楚情况，母公司是不会单纯因为价格因素就将自己旗下最优秀的子公司给卖掉，公司总裁一定会问，为什么要把我皇冠上的珠宝给变卖掉，不过当场景转换到其个人的投资组合时，他却又会毫不犹豫地，甚至是情急地从这家公司换到另一家公司，靠的不过是股票经纪人肤浅的几句话语，其中最烂的一句当属，你不会因为获利而破产，你能想象要是一家公司的总裁用类似的方式建议董事会将最有潜力的子公司给卖掉时，就我个人的观点，适用于企业经营的原则也同样适用于股票投资，投资人在持有一家公司的股票所展现的韧性应当与一家公司的老板持有公司全部的股权一样。

Interestingly, corporate managers have no trouble understanding that point when they are focusing on a business they operate: A parent company that owns a subsidiary with superb long-term economics is not likely to sell that entity regardless of price."Why," the CEO would ask,"should I part with my crown jewel?" Yet that same CEO, when it comes to running his personal investment portfolio, will offhandedly - and even impetuously - move from business to business when presented with no more than superficial arguments by his broker for doing so. The worst of these is perhaps,"You can't go broke taking a profit." Can you imagine a CEO using this line to urge his board to sell a star subsidiary?

Nor was the party over in 1938 for an investor： Though the $40 invested in 1919 in one share had turned into $3，277 by the end of 1938， a fresh $40 then invested in Coca-Cola 16 有趣的是企业经理人在认定何者才是自己本业时，从来就不会搞不清楚情况，母公司是不会单纯因为价格因素就将自己旗下最优秀的子公司给卖掉，公司总裁一定会问，为什么要把我皇冠上的珠宝给变卖掉，不过当场景转换到其个人的投资组合时，他却又会毫不犹豫地，甚至是情急地从这家公司换到另一家公司，靠的不过是股票经纪人肤浅的几句话语，其中最烂的一句当属，你不会因为获利而破产，你能想象要是一家公司的总裁用类似的方式建议董事会将最有潜力的子公司给卖掉时，就我个人的观点，适用于企业经营的原则也同样适用于股票投资，投资人在持有一家公司的股票所展现的韧性应当与一家公司的老板持有公司全部的股权一样。

When growth rates are under discussion, it will pay you to be suspicious as to why the beginning and terminal years have been selected. If either year was aberrational, any calculation of growth will be distorted. In particular, a base year in which earnings were poor can produce a breathtaking, but meaningless, growth rate. In the table above, however, the base year of 1965 was abnormally good ; Berkshire earned more money in that year than it did in all but one of the previous ten.

一般在谈到成长率时，各位可能会怀疑基期与终期是如何选定的，因为如果选择不当，任何计算出来的结果都可能会被大大扭曲，尤其当基期的盈余过低时，很可能得出惊人但却不合理的成长率，不过在上表中，1965年的表现算是相当的不错，当年度的获利在那之前的十年中排名第二。

Our homestate operation, led by Rod Eldred; our workers' compensation business, headed by Brad Kinstler; our credit card operation, managed by the Kizer family; National Indemnity's traditional auto and general liability business, led by Don Wurster - all of these generated significant underwriting profits accompanied by substantial float. We can conclude this section as we did last year: All in all, we have a first-class insurance business.

伯克希尔其它保险事业 1994 年的营运表现皆相当杰出，由 Rod 领导的住宅保险， Brad 带领的员工退休保险以及由 Kizer 家族经营的信用卡保险业务，以及由 Don 所领导的国家产险所从事的传统汽车保险与一般责任险方面，总的来说，这四类业务都表现的相当不错，不但有承保获利，还贡献了相当大金额的保险浮存金。

Berkshire's other insurance operations had excellent results in 1994. Our homestate operation, led by Rod Eldred; our workers' compensation business, headed by Brad Kinstler; our credit card operation, managed by the Kizer family; National Indemnity's traditional auto and general liability business, led by Don Wurster - all of these generated significant underwriting profits accompanied by substantial float.

Berkshire其它保险事业1994年的营运表现皆相当杰出，由Rod领导的住宅保险、Brad带领的员工退休保险以及由Kizer家族经营的信用卡保险业务，以及由Don所领导的国家产险所从事的传统汽车保险与一般责任险方面，总的来说，这四类业务都表现的相当不错，不但有承保获利，还贡献了相当大金额的保险浮存金。。

Between 1936 and 1975, GEICO grew from a standing start to a 4% market share, becoming the country's fourth largest auto insurer. During most of this period, the company was superbly managed, achieving both excellent volume gains and high profits. It looked unstoppable. But after my friend and hero Lorimer Davidson retired as CEO in 1970, his successors soon made a huge mistake by underreserving for losses. This produced faulty cost information, which in turn produced inadequate pricing. By 1976, GEICO was on the brink of failure.

从1936到1975这40年间，GEICO从无到4%的市场占有率，成为全美第四大的汽车保险公司，大部份的时候，公司的经营相当上轨道，营收与获利同步成长，看起来势不可挡，但直到该公司总裁，同时也是我的好朋友Davidson在1970年宣布退休，情势随即起了变化，他的继任者犯下损失准备提拨不足的大错，此举大大扭曲了成本结构，进而导致不当的订价，1976年，GEICO已濒临倒闭。

Guinness, however, earns its money in much the same fashion as Coca-Cola and Gillette, U.S.-based companies that garner most of their profits from international operations. Indeed, in the sense of where they earn their profits continent-by-continent - Coca-Cola and Guinness display strong similarities. But you'll never get their drinks confused - and your Chairman remains unmovably in the Cherry Coke camp.

我们在健力士 Guinness 的持股代表伯克希尔第一次对海外公司进行大规模的投资，不过 Guinness 所赚的钱与可口可乐，吉列刮胡刀等美国公司却极为类似，主要都是仰赖国际部门的营运，确实以国际性的眼光来看， Guinness 与可口可乐的获利来源有相当的共通性，(但是大家绝对不能将自己最爱的饮料搞混掉，像我个人的最爱依旧是樱桃可口可乐)。

But my analysis of USAir's business was both superficial and wrong. I was so beguiled by the company's long history of profitableoperations, and by the protection that ownership of a senior security seemingly offered me, that I overlooked the crucial point: USAir's revenues would increasingly feel the effects of an unregulated, fiercely-competitive market whereas its cost structurewas a holdover from the days when regulation protected profits. These costs, if left unchecked, portended disaster, however reassuring the airline's past record might be.

不过我对于美国航空业的分析研究实在是过于肤浅且错误百出，我被该公司过去历年来的获利能力所蒙骗，同时过分相信特别股可以提供给我们在债权上的保护，以致于忽略了最关键的一点︰那就是美国航空的营收受到毫无节制的激烈价格竞争而大幅下滑的同时，其成本结构却仍旧停留在从前管制时代的高档，这样的高成本结构若不能找到有效解决的办法，将成为灾难的前兆，不管以前航空业曾经享有多么辉煌的历史。

Next time I make a big, dumb decision, Berkshire shareholders will know what to do: Phone Mr. Wolf. In addition to the convertible preferreds, we purchased one other private placement in 1991,$300 million of American Express Percs. This security was essentially a common stock that featured a tradeoff in its first three years: We received extra dividend payments during that period, but we were also capped in the price appreciation we could realize.

除了可转换特别股，我们在 1991 年还透过私募的方式投资了三亿美元的美国运通俗称&Percs&的股票，这种证券基本上算是一种普通股，只不过在投资的前三年我们可以领取一笔特别的股利，条件是在同时间我们因为股价上涨所带来的资本利得将受到限制，然而即便如此，这笔投资还是因为本人的英明决策而获利不菲，当然其中也包含一些运气的成份，比例约是 110%。

CRC Party legally and beneficially holds without Encumbrance the Hinoba-an Interest in the Colet Claims over the Hinoba-an Property, being an undivided 92.5 per cent. right, title and interest in the Hinoba-an Property through the Intermediary Holding Companies and Selenga, subject to the three per cent.

有没有累赘的情况下，CRC当事人合法获利地握有针对Hinoba-an 资产的Colet索赔中的利益，是一个未分开的92.5%的正确的资格和通过媒介控股公司和Selenga 的Hinoba-an 产权中的利益。

I didn't watch TV last night, because it .

昨晚我没有看电视，因为电视机坏了。

Since this year, in a lot of villages of Beijing, TV of elevator liquid crystal was removed.

今年以来，在北京的很多小区里，电梯液晶电视被撤了下来。