约束博弈

In the chapter of improving banking supervision, we analyze the games with complete and incomplete information between supervisors and banks, and their strategies therein during the operating and market exiting stages. We come to the conclusion that in the long run, the supervision of operational risks should progress from direct surveillance to indirect surveillance. In the chapter of incentives and constraints, we first discuss the reform of personnel system (non- monetary rewards and punishments) and salary system in the SOBs, demonstrated with an optimal model. Then we show that it is feasible for senior executives of SOBs to bear a part of operational risk loss through a model of guarantee and compensation. It is a bold attempt in current situation when domestic liability insurance market is still not mature.

银行业监管一章，我们通过设计一组监管部门与国有商业银行的完全信息和不完全信息博弈，分析了它们在运营阶段和市场退出阶段的政策选择，并提出了对操作风险的监管在长期要实现从"直接监管"到"间接监管"的转变；激励约束一章，我们首先讨论了国有商业银行的人事制度与薪酬制度改革，并通过一个最优化模型给予说明，然后设计了一个操作风险损失保证金与赔偿金模型来说明让国有商业银行高级管理人员负担一部分操作风险损失的可行性。

Methods The scope and basis of the game of motivation and restrain were analysed and discussed by the methods of cooperative game and the theory of motivation and restrain.

运用激励与约束理论以及合作博弈的方法，分析和讨论在单阶段和多阶段条件下管理者和被管理者激励与约束的有效范围、最优决策的选择依据和决策过程。

This paper carries out study on corporate governance based on system theory, advances concept of corporate governance, analyzes and abstracts system core of corporate governance from the point of mechanism by means of study on environment energy-rank principle, running mechanism and model of corporate governance. This paper analyzes mechanism of stimulation and restraint by using game theory, verifies effect of stock right structure on efficiency of corporate governance in view of connection between capital and corporate governance, gives method of resolving optimum stock right limit of collection and deconcentration and adventure share model of blending capital, and discusses problem of entrance of stakeholders to corporate governance etc.

本论文以系统理论为基础对公司治理结构进行了研究，提出了公司治理结构系统的概念，分析提炼出了公司治理结构系统核，并通过对公司治理结构系统环境、系统能级原理和系统运行机制与模式的研究，从机制的角度分析了公司治理结构系统运行模式；运用博弈论对公司治理过程中的激励约束机制进行了分析；针对资本结构与公司治理结构的关系，运用模型验证了股权结构对公司治理效率的影响，给出了求解最佳股权集散度的方法和融资风险分担模型；探讨了利益相关者介入公司治理结构的问题等等。

In addition, the paper demonstrates the influence of external supervision from the angle of the game theory: generally, listed companies proactively disclose good news, and whether they initiatively disclose bad news or not depends on different constraints.

最后，对外界监督压力存在的情况进行了博弈分析。上市公司一般会选择主动披露"好消息"，但主动披露"坏消息"的行为则随约束条件的不同而变化。

This paper analyses the homogenous tendency of open-end fund at first,pointing out that unperfect development of market and investors' immature investment opinions is the origin of such phenomena. Secondly,having compared the fund sizes and purchase fee rates of 25 open-end funds in China,conclude that there are problems of diseconomy of scale and indistinctive relativity between fees and achievement in Chinese open-end funds. Then this paper introduces benefit and cost function to analyze the problem of lack of motivation and constrain mechanism towards fund managers because of unreasonable fees in China. Thirdly,this paper analyze funds managers' normal hazards by static game model,and then points out fund managers have serious tunneling behaviors in Chinese open-end fund industry. In the end,this paper analyzes the causes of liquidity risk of open-end fun and the particularity of liquidity risk of open-end fund in China,and concludes that liquidity risk in Chinese open-end fund industry is higher through calculating the rates of share change and comparing the portfolio selections of top 20 open-end funds in China.

本文首先分析了我国目前存在的基金产品同质化现象，指出市场发展的不完善以及投资者投资理念的不成熟是同质化的根源所在；其次对比了我国现有的25只开放式基金的规模和申购费率，得出了我国开放式基金存在着规模效应不明显以及基金业绩与费率相关性不强的问题，并引入效益函数和成本函数分析了由于我国开放式基金费率不合理引发的基金管理者激励约束机制缺失的问题；再次，应用静态博弈模型分析了基金管理人面临的道德风险，指出目前我国开放式基金由于监管机制脆弱而存在着较为严重的管理者利益输送行为；最后，分析了开放式基金流动性风险的形成原因以及我国基金市场流动性风险的特殊性，并通过计算目前我国基金资产规模前20位的开放式基金的份额变动率以及比较它们的投资组合结构，得出了目前我国开放式基金流动性风险偏大的结论。

This paper also applies game theory to set up game models for ante-accommodation and post-accommodation. In the information model for ante-accommodation, commercial banks expect the occurrence of separate game equivalence not the pooled game equivalence, for in pooled game equivalence, commercial banks may easily choose adverse selection to provide loans because of asymmetric information, while in the supervision model for post-accommodation, banks and enterprises hardly make pure strategic equivalence, that is, they can not achieve Pareto optimum in the same time, meanwhile, when the supervision model for post-accommodation achieve pooled strategic equivalence, we will make use of probabilities of enterprises not keeping their promises and probabilities of bank supervision as indexes for describing qualitatively the credit risk for enterprises and the credit risk for bank supervision.

首先，论文对信贷活动中信息不对称所产生的逆向选择与道德风险及由此产生的信贷风险进行了一般理论分析，并提出了防范逆向选择和道德风险的一般模型；其次，论文结合我国信贷市场预算约束软化这一根本特征，研究了我国信贷活动中由信息不对称而产生的信贷风险形成机理的特殊性进行了分析；接着，运用博弈论方法对我国信贷市场中商业银行与企业在申请贷款、偿还贷款时的博弈行为进行了深入分析；最后，文章提出了消除信贷市场信息不对称的对策和建议。

Firstly, this paper discussed the principle and agent theory, the corporate governance theory and supervision theory. Second, the paper analyzed special several-levels principle-agent relations of the state-owned enterprise, and used the principle -agent theory and the game theory to analyze several problems caused by this, such as the supervision function avianization about the owner, the enterpriser"s rent-seeking activity, the enterpriser"s conspiracy behavior and the insider control. Thirdly, the paper discussed the present situation of the supervision and restraint system from the management model of the three-levels authorization, financial general supervision system, the corporate governance and the outsider supervision and restraint system. The paper thought that the supervision and restraint system had the following problems: supervision and restraint system was imperfect, the property right restraint was lack, the restraint system was administrative and the supervision system was deformity.

本文首先讨论了经营者监督约束机制的委托代理理论、公司治理理论和监督理论：其次，深入分析了国有企业特殊的多级委托代理关系，并用博弈理论及委托代理理论分析了由此产生的各种问题，如所有者监督职能弱化、国有企业经营者的寻租行为、国企经营者合谋及内部人控制等；再次，本文从三级授权经营模式、财务总监制、公司治理结构及经营者外部监督约束等方面研究了我国经营者监督约束机制的现状，本文认为国有企业经营者的监督与约束存在以下问题：国有股份多级代理与监督约束弱化；国家股东对国企经营者缺乏产权约束，监督约束机制不完善；国有股份高度集中与监督约束的行政化；监督约束机制单一化与监督约束畸形化。

So the kind of this game is beneficial to each party and will result in win-win, what essential for each party is to increase the internal competitive ability and build the competitive advantage, which will benefit each party indirectly in return, and whereunder lies the theoretical and realistic meaning for this research.

在多边贸易体制规则约束下，各成员博弈的结果是社会总得益趋向扩大，各方得益多寡虽有所不同但总体趋向于不为零的正数，所以，多边贸易体制下的博弈本质上是合作的共赢性博弈。

There are two clear kinds of enterprise governance in developed countries ——the mode charactered in Anglo-Saxon countries and the mode charactered in Japan and German.

占主流的企业治理结构是联合生产的各要素在外在约束下长期博弈结果的产物。

However farmer are in the disadvantage of profit allocating. There are a lot of limited factors, such as the number of breeding、farmers production skills、characteristic of animal husbandry、increasing of feed price, in the process of game between farmer、cattle dealer and corporation.

但在农户与牛贩子和企业的博弈过程中，因为农户自身的饲养规模、技术水平等因素的限制，以及畜牧业行业的特点和饲料价格上涨等条件的约束，使农户处于利益分配的弱势地位。

So that more consumers can enjoy more delicious quality, technology is even better than wine.

让更多的消费者可以品尝到品质更为鲜美，工艺更为精湛的葡萄酒。

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在你最喜爱的文本编辑器中将它打开。