权力

A strict constructionalist, Jefferson also believed that a U.S. president did not have the authority to engage in such a deal because it was not specified in the constitution, and that to do so would moreover erode states' rights by increasing federal executive power.

作为一个严谨的建构主义者，杰弗逊同时也相信美国总统没有权力进行如此大的一项收购，因为这种做法没有在宪法中特别提及，并且这样做会增加联邦执行的权力，从而更多的削减各州的权力。

According to Olson's theory, the state is trans-formed from stationary bandit. The autocratic state power is formed in such a way that individuals resorting to violence exercise private power to maximize self-interest.

在奥尔森的理论中，国家是由固定下来的匪帮转化来的，专制国家权力的产生是拥有暴力或私人权力的主体以自身利益最大化的方式运用私人权力的结果。

Thereout we know that the factors determining the growing of the mode of the educationl idealization and the prosess of the idealization are two:one is the power,and the other is the thinking foundation by which the one with the power realizes the power.

由此可以推知，决定教育理想化模式的生成及模式化过程的，有两条主要线索，一条是权力，另一条就是权力者实现权力的思想依据。

But that does not prove that their voters cannot grasp the democratic idea, only that voters' choices can be uncongenial to the few who have power and are prepared neither to yield nor share it.

但是这并不证明他们的选民不理解民主的概念，也只有这些选民的抉择能够不取悦于极少数拥有权力而不愿意屈从于权力或共享权力的人。

Government interest is unusual in that government occupies special position and enjoys sufficient power, finance and cultural resources in the administrative activities. The unusualness of government interest and position brings about the inadequate interest of government. Driven by the inadequate interest, government will inevitably expand or reduce its administrative power at its free will.

政府在行政活动中具有充分的权力、财力和文化资源支持，有着特殊的角色地位，因此政府利益具有特殊性，政府利益的特殊性和地位角色的特点使得政府存在着不适当利益，在不适当利益的驱使下，政府必然可以利用自身特有资源扩张或缩小行政权力，甚至根本不使用行政权力。

In chapter 1,we discuss the certainty of synthesis of interest.Interest is afunction of demand,power and information.The foundation of synthesis ofeconomic interest is complicated economic demand and complicatedeconomic power.

第一章首先由利益的三个内在要素——需要、信息和权力——引出利益综合的必然性：非对称的需要、信息与权力结构，进而，分析经济利益综合的基础：综合经济需要和综合经济权力。

And therefore, whatever form the common-wealth is under, the ruling power ought to govern by declared and received laws, and not by extemporary dictates and undetermined resolutions: for then mankind will be in a far worse condition than in the state of nature, if they shall have armed one, or a few men with the joint power of a multitude, to force them to obey at pleasure the exorbitant and unlimited decrees of their sudden thoughts, or unrestrained, and till that moment unknown wills, without having any measures set down which may guide and justify their actions: for all the power the government has, being only for the good of the society, as it ought not to be arbitrary and at pleasure, so it ought to be exercised by established and promulgated laws; that both the people may know their duty, and be safe and secure within the limits of the law; and the rulers too kept within their bounds, and not be tempted, by the power they have in their hands, to employ it to such purposes, and by such measures, as they would not have known, and own not willingly.

因此，国家无论采取什么形式，其统治权力都应依据业已公布且被接受的法律而不是临时的指令或犹豫不定的决义来进行治理；因为，假若人类用群众的联合的力量来武装一个或几个人，任其随心所欲地迫使人们服从其一时心血来潮所做出的种种过分的、无限制的命令或是毫无节制的、此时尚不得而知的意志，而同时却没有任何固定的措施来引导他们的行为或为之辩护，那么，人类将处于比自然状态远为糟糕的境地；既然政府所拥有的一切权力均旨在为社会谋福利，因而不应专断独行、随心所欲，因此，它必须依据明确规定且公诸于众的法律来行使；这样，不仅人民可以了解他们的义务，在法律范围内得到安全和保障；而且，统治者也可以受到法律的约束，而不致被手中掌握的权力所诱惑，进而利用它达到特定的目的，且采用特定的手段，而这样的目的和手段是他们本来可能不会知道、也不愿承认的。

Though, as I said, the executive and federative power of every community be really distinct in themselves, yet they are hardly to be separated, and placed at the same time, in the hands of distinct persons: for both of them requiring the force of the society for their exercise, it is almost impracticable to place the force of the common-wealth in distinct, and not subordinate hands; or that the executive and federative power should be placed in persons, that might act separately, whereby the force of the public would be under different commands: which would be apt some time or other to cause disorder and ruin.

虽然，如我所说，每个共同体的执行和外交权力本身确实区别明显，然而它们也很难分开，同时交给完全不同的人：因为这两种权力的行使都要求社会的力量，将共同体的力量交给两个独立互不从属的机构，这几乎不可能做到；或者执行和外交权力可以交给独立行动的机构，那么公众的力量将接受两种不同的命令：这迟早将引起混乱和毁灭。良好的人性，恰当的理性，和对上帝的信仰。一个种族若不能从经验中得到理性，上帝会让他们不断的遭遇，直至毁灭。

Legal supe rvision and public powers are,so to speak,twins parasitizing in the state instit utions.

可以说，有了公共权力，便有了对公共权力的监督，法律监督是人类社会治理权力腐败的神圣使命和主要方式。

The first chapter gives a brief introduction of Schmitt\'s life and main works together with the evolution of his concepts of state of exception and state emergency powers. The second chapter expounds Schmitt\'s claims on state emergency powers in the state of exception: it should allow the sovereignty unrestrictive powers to decide on the state of exception. In the state of exception the president must be empowered the unrestrictive emergency power to watch constitution. Both the parliament and ministry of justice cannot defend constitution in the state of exception.

第二章则阐述施米特关于例外状态下国家紧急权力的主张：决断例外状态需要不受限制的主权权力：例外状态下只有赋予不受限制的紧急权给总统才能守护宪法，议会、司法机关都不能在例外状态下捍卫宪法；例外状态下要捍卫国家、宪法，需要授予像总统这样的特别立法者以甚至侵犯宪法的立法权力。

Neither the killing of Mr Zarqawi nor any breakthrough on the political front will stop the insurgency and the fratricidal murders in their tracks.

在对危险的南部地区访问时，他斥责什叶派民兵领导人对中央集权的挑衅行为。

In fact,I've got him on the satellite mobile right now.

实际上 我们已接通卫星可视电话了