博弈论模型

Through to the simulation of the model, we can analyse enterprise's optional selection tactics set and corresponding selection cost value, and the candidate quantity that may attracted under the tactics when the rival's selection tactics change. The model can offer intelligent decision for the enterprise to optimize CIO selection mechanism and change the tactics of selecting.

分析了企业CIO甄选机制的内涵，根据定性建模方法和博弈论有关原理，基于CIO人力资本与企业的博弈行为构建了企业CIO甄选筛选博弈模拟模型，并对模拟结果进行了分析，研究构造企业CIO甄选机制时应考虑的因素，以合理设计企业CIO过滤功能，实现对CIO人力资本完全成功的分离均衡。

This paper mainly uses the tactics method of the evolutionary game namely replicator dynamics and the ESS under the boundedly rational conditions, with the hawk and pigeon model including the factor of power conflict , and case analysis method , which have carried on deep analysis to the course of the power conflict between the superior and the subordinate in company's political behavior, it draw superior with in what it is subordinate terms adopt tough offensive hawk strategy, adopt pigeon's strategy under some conditions , namely how to exercise one's own power.

本文主要用博弈论中进化博弈即有限理性条件下的复制动态和进化稳定策略方法，用加入权力冲突因素的鹰鸽博弈模型，以及案例分析的方法，对公司政治行为中上下级之间权力冲突的过程进行了深入的分析，得出了上司与下属在什么条件下采用强硬的进攻性的鹰战略，在什么条件下采用鸽战略，即如何行使各自的权力。

In chapter four, we make a positive research part of this text.

本文的创新在于用博弈论的理论模型对电子商务市场信誉的可信性与稳定度进行研究。

According to this phenomenon, this paper established game model for passerby and traffic officer by means of the basic principles of game theory. Two methods including pure strategy and mixed strategy will be introduced here. Based on the analysis, this paper found that there was no Nash equilibrium on pure strategy. And strengthening management on the traffic officer will reduce the probability of passerby running a red light. Furthermore, even though strengthening the penalty of the illegal passerby will make effect in short time. However, in the longtime, the phenomenon will go on and the traffic officer will be lazier at reverse.

针对这一现象，本文利用博弈论的基本原理，建立行人和交警的博弈模型，通过纯策略与混合策略这两种方法对行人和交警的博弈进行分析，结果发现行人和交警之间的博弈不存在纯策略纳什均衡，而在混合策略下，得出了只有加大对交警的监管力度才可以降低行人闯红灯的发生率，相反即使加大对闯红灯的行人的处罚力度，短期内的确可以起到一定的效果，但是就长期而言，闯红灯现象发生依旧频繁，而且使得交警更加的懒惰，达到适得其反的效果。

This paper also applies game theory to set up game models for ante-accommodation and post-accommodation. In the information model for ante-accommodation, commercial banks expect the occurrence of separate game equivalence not the pooled game equivalence, for in pooled game equivalence, commercial banks may easily choose adverse selection to provide loans because of asymmetric information, while in the supervision model for post-accommodation, banks and enterprises hardly make pure strategic equivalence, that is, they can not achieve Pareto optimum in the same time, meanwhile, when the supervision model for post-accommodation achieve pooled strategic equivalence, we will make use of probabilities of enterprises not keeping their promises and probabilities of bank supervision as indexes for describing qualitatively the credit risk for enterprises and the credit risk for bank supervision.

首先，论文对信贷活动中信息不对称所产生的逆向选择与道德风险及由此产生的信贷风险进行了一般理论分析，并提出了防范逆向选择和道德风险的一般模型；其次，论文结合我国信贷市场预算约束软化这一根本特征，研究了我国信贷活动中由信息不对称而产生的信贷风险形成机理的特殊性进行了分析；接着，运用博弈论方法对我国信贷市场中商业银行与企业在申请贷款、偿还贷款时的博弈行为进行了深入分析；最后，文章提出了消除信贷市场信息不对称的对策和建议。

In writing on analysing the tactfulness foundation of quotation method research present situation, make the mathematics model of the optimization quotation problem of power plant, and have given based on rich run to discuss and probability theory beg the method of untying.

文中在分析策略性报价方法研究现状的基础上，提出了电厂优化报价问题的数学模型，并给出了基于博弈论和概率论的求解方法。

there are short-term trade and long-term trade between supplier and buyer in the outsourcing. in this paper, the theory of repeated games is employed to discuss the quality for supplier and buyer under the different circumstances and the game model is set up.

在业务外包中，购买商和供应商有短期交易和长期合作，本文利用博弈论中的重复博弈理论，建立了博弈模型，并且在不同条件下讨论了购买商和供应商基于产品质量的有限次与无限次重复博弈。

On the base of knowledge on game theory,this paper established a mathematical model on players' unconstraint investment in public goods under the condition of complete information within enterprise.

本文以博弈论的理论为基础，建立了在完全信息下企业内部公共物品的自愿投资行为模型，并以此为背景分析了企业文化建设的问题。

Furthermore, the knowledge accumulated on the nature of the innovation diffusion process is still rather limited and without a satisfactory theoretical framework. Based on microeconomics, games theory, and environmental economics, a general economic model of REET diffusion is established in this thesis, which combines the market equilibrium and the Stackelburg equilibrium.

本文在微观经济学、博弈论和环境经济学基础上，构建了一个一般性的可再生能源与节能技术推广经济学模型，将代表市场制度的市场均衡和代表政府干预制度的Stackelburg均衡有机结合在一起，为定量研究以可持续发展为导向的可再生能源与节能技术推广的体制与政策提供了理论依据。

The thoughts, methodologies of gamed theory and information economy is employed expound the conditions for cooperation balance to efficiently maintain in long-term, and determine the internal mechanism for individual node enterprise to efficiently cooperate in long-term.

运用博弈论和信息经济学的思想方法，通过建立和分析供应链节点间不完全信息动态博弈模型，论述了合作均衡长期有效维持的条件，分析了供应链内各企业长期有效合作的内在机制。

Do you know, i need you to come back

你知道吗，我需要你回来

Yang yinshu、Wang xiangsheng、Li decang,The first discovery of haemaphysalis conicinna.

1〕 杨银书，王祥生，李德昌。安徽省首次发现嗜群血蜱。