博弈论模型

This paper founds a bidding strategys frame based on the game theory. This paper combines the game theory and the principal-agent theory and expounds the cost-plus based on the bidding and the bidding based on the contract.

本文建立了一个基于博弈论的招投标机制设计的研究框架，从而为招投标机制设计提供了一个规范的分析思路；另外本文还将完全信息动态博弈与委托—代理理论结合起来，开创性的提出了基于招投标机制的最优成本补偿合同和基于合同的招投标模型，不仅可以包括线性合同的激励，而且还能解决基于博弈论的非线性激励合同问题；在提出的相似标的概念基础之上，本文还综合了相关模型，针对相似标的的特点，给出了几个相似标的的招投标模型。

First of all, the evolutionary game model of this system is built, according to a population and determinately dynamic function in evolutionary game theory, and quilibrium structure and effect factors of the evolutionary system are analyzed. Next, the evolution quilibrium characteristics of investor behaviors in China's securities market are researched as a demonstration, and the reasons why noise traders become popular in the process of investor behavior evolution are explained, based on its evolutionary mechanism. Moreover, the influences of investor behavior evolution on share market's fluctuation are researched through setting up its noise trade model. When noise traders are dominant in securities market, price discovery function and resource configuration effect are also analyzed. Finally, when noise trade become popular, the shortage of some policies, such as, enlarging institution investor and short sale is explained, and some good suggestions are provided according to former research results.

首先，应用进化博弈论中的单群体确定性模仿者动态方程建立证券投资者行为的进化博弈模型，并对进化系统的均衡结构特征及其影响因素进行分析；其次，根据我国证券市场实际，对我国证券投资者行为进化的均衡结构进行实证分析，并从投资者行为进化的角度，解释我国证券投资者行为进化为噪声交易主导市场的原因；然后，通过建立股市波动的噪声交易模型，研究投资者行为的进化对股市波动的影响，并进一步分析我国噪声交易主导市场时对市场价格发现和资源配置功能的影响；最后，根据理论及实证的研究成果，分析噪声交易主导市场时大力发展机构投资者等制度作用的有限性，并进一步提出我国证券市场相机治理的政策建议。

In the current study in China through the property services industry pricing model research and analysis, these two find the current property services pricing of existing problems and shortcomings, that China\'s property services pricing requirements, the property services industry focus on Hotelling Model of a practical method of analysis, in reference to the Hotelling model based on the combination of game theory and the theory of economics and characteristics of China\'s property services can be established as far as the property owners of both enterprises and service needs as much as possible To meet the price model, on the basis of our property services business of the new pricing model.

在研究中通过对现行中国物业服务行业的定价模式的研究分析，找到目前这两种物业服务定价方式存在的问题和缺陷，得出对于中国物业服务定价的要求，重点对物业服务行业对霍特林模型研究方法的实用性进行了分析，从而在参考霍特林模型的基础上，结合博弈论和经济学的相关理论以及中国物业服务特点建立能够尽量让物业服务企业和业主双方需求尽可能达到满足时的价格模型，在此基础上探讨我国物业服务企业定价的新模式。

At first, in this paper the national and international literature of team and team motivation is summarized. Secondly, based on the analysis of theoretical scientific research personnel and team, the teamwork motivation model is built, and it is achieved that teamwork improves the team output. Later,we lead the reputation that is regarded inexplicit incentive into the scientific research personnel"s utility function, establish a model of their reward, analyze the parameter of reputation"s effect to factor in the contract. After that, it analyses traditional training object selection and whole training object selection among the scientific research team to draw the conclusion that the traditional training object selection has obvious limitations and the whole training has evident advantages. In the end, based on the theoretical study of the psychological contract, we can obtain the effective paths of forming psychological contract among the scientific research team.

本文首先对团队和团队激励方面国内外的文献进行了详尽的综述；其次，在对科研人员及科研团队理论分析的基础上，建立了适合科研团队激励机制的基于团队合作的激励模型，得出成员间互相合作将提高科研团队的产出；然后，将声誉效应和职业生涯时间引入科研团队成员报酬契约，建立了科研团队成员的报酬激励模型，分析声誉系数和职业生涯时间对契约中各要素的影响；接着，通过博弈论知识分析了科研团队培训对象选拔制度，得出以下结论：传统培训对象选拔制度在以团队为主的组织中存在着明显的局限性，全员培训制度具有明显的优势；最后，在对心理契约理论研究的基础上，得出了缔结科研团队心理契约的途径。

There is mutual contradiction between direction estimation of user's signal and power allocation among all users in the beamforming algorithm. A twice game beamforming algorithm based on game theory is proposed to deal with it. Beamforming game algorithm mathematics model is constructed. During the first game, direction of signal and power allocation are mapped the game theory as "player", which are modeled as the problem of maximin function and obtain direction estimation first. Then during the second game, power allocations of different users are described as a multi-user game. Power updated algorithm is designed. The existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in the twice game beamforming algorithm based on game theory are proved by mathematics derivation.

摘要针对波束成形算法中，用户的信号方向估计值和用户之间的功率分配存在着相互矛盾，本文提出了一种基于博弈论的二次博弈波束成形算法，构建了波束成形博弈算法数学模型，首先在第一次博弈的时候，将波束成形算法中的信号方向和功率分配映射为博弈论数学模型中的"局中人"，将其建模为函数的极大极小值求解问题，先求解出信号方向；然后在第二次博弈的时候，将不同用户的功率分配过程描述为一个多用户的博弈过程，设计了功率分配更新算法，通过数学推导论证了纳什平衡点的存在性和唯一性。

Then through seting up game theory model, the author prove that the form of modular network organization can achieve the pareto equilibrium, and propose that the relation-assets among enterprises are the essential distinction between module network and market.

建立博弈论模型，研究模块化网络组织模式对博弈均衡的改进，并指出是否存在企业间关系性资产是模块化网络与市场的本质区别。

This paper introduces the game theory and sets up, based on it, the choice model for the public transportation priority by identifying the function of the payoff and the muster of attendee and stratagem. In addition, it analyses the existence of NASH equilibrium, and puts forward the arithmetic of Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Strategies in the general condition, the Integrated Strategies in the special condition and the flow chart of the model. At last, it verifies the feasibility of the model with the given example.

本文采用了博弈论的理论，通过对公交优先系统中参与者集合N、战略集合S和收益函数u的确定，建立了一种基于博弈论的公交优先技术方案选择博弈模型来量化方案选择问题；在此基础上分析了NASH均衡的存在性，并且给出了一般情况下的重复剔除劣战略和特殊情况下的混合策略两种模型求解方法以及公交优先技术方案选择博弈模型的流程图；最后通过算例分析，验证了博弈模型应用于公交优先技术方案选择的可行性。

This will promote to the airline company improving services and enhance level of management and benefit of operation. This will advances the development of national economic and meet the requirement of people life and business activity, and increase the living quantity, and adapt to the travel industry to make use of. Everyone in the civil aviation should pay attention to.This paper analyzes the problem of development of regional aviation transport from three angles. Combining with the background of our country social economy development, and the speeding and improving service and advancing the marketing means, the compete power of three main transportation modes of regional aviation and railroad and highway in our country. From angle of tripper, a mathematical model of trip cost is established to quantitatively describe the choice behavior of passengers to select the model transportation. A

结合我国社会经济发展的背景，以及地面铁路和公路不但提速、改进服务和营销手段的现状，首先定性的分析了我国目前主要的三种客运方式支线航空运输、公路运输和铁路运输的竞争能力，然后从旅行者的角度，使用旅客出行成本模型，对成渝线、福厦线和台高线航线上不同出行方式的出行成本进行了对比研究，提出降低旅行成本，增强支线航空运输竞争能力的建议和方法；接着提出了利用层次分析法和模糊评判理论，对目前国内所采用的支线机型进行分析比较的方法，建立了选择支线机型的方法和评判标准，这给航空公司在发展支线航空选择机型时提供了一种评价选择方式；然后应用博弈论的方法、模型，分析支线航空运输航线结构变动时各种运输方式的经济行为、成因、结果及合理措施，提出航空公司发展支线航空运输的对策；最后对我国支线航空运输的现状进行了分析，并对未来支线航空运输的发展进行了预测，有针对性地提出了我国支线航空运输的发展策略。

The paper analyses the mode of expressway network charge distribution and existing questions, in view of the questions that go against regional highway network coordinated development, puts forward new theory and method of expressway network charge distribution; making use of game theory, constructing the model of expressway network charge distribution which has breakage risk and multi-people bid in turn, and analyzing characteristics of the model and advertent questions in application.

论文分析了现行高速公路网收费收入分配模式及其存在的问题，针对现行收入分配模式存在的不利于区域公路网协调发展的问题，提出了新的高速公路网收费分配理论和方法；运用博弈论理论，构建了具有破裂风险的多人轮流出价的高速公路收费收入分配模型，并分析模型的特点和模型应用注意的问题。

The content of each part follow as: In the first chapter, as start point and base of the paper, this part focuses on the basic study ofdefinition characteristic of NO, and the existing base of NO-E-Commerceenvironment; In the second one, this part studies the theory base of NO comprehensively applying the theories of core competence competent strategy and transaction cost; Chapter three studies the NO from the coordination of NO, and gives the structure clarification and characteristic of NO firstly, at the same time, put forward the concept of Virtual Enterprise Cluster; Based on such conclusion, studies the model of NO from life cyc organization level process and value chain, and operational mode; In Chapter four, a theoretical explanation was addressed on the above structure by modeling NO with game theory and graphic theory; In the fifth chapter, on the bases of analysis of NO operational risks, coordination mechanism of NO was studied by individually modeling the NO without core and NO with core, and then put forward the solution for coordination mechanism of NO; As an important component of coordination mechanism of NO, Chapter six explored some basic concept of trust and importantly put forward the way of how to build trust in NO, especially investigated the supporting function of valid reputation mechanism of NO for the trust building, importantly an operational method on building reputation mechanism and evaluation method in NO were given; The last chapter applied theconclusion of the paper to investigate the famous trade Web-SUNBU.

全文共分为七章，主要内容如下：第一章作为全文的理论出发点和基础，围绕网络组织的定义、特征以及网络组织生存基础--电子商务环境等方面对网络组织的基本概念进行了阐述；第二章综合运用核心能力、竞争战略和交易费用理论对网络组织产生的理论基础进行阐述；第三章首先从组织协调的角度对网络组织进行了研究，给出了网络组织的结构，分类和特征，同时并给出了虚拟企业群簇；然后在此基础上分别研究了网络组织的生命周期模型、层次模型、过程模型、价值链模型，以及运行模式；第四章综合运用博弈论、图论的相关知识，通过构建网络组织的模型，对上一章所研究的网络组织结构的形成机理给出了一种理论解释；第五章在分析网络组织运行风险的基础上，分别建立无盟主网络组织的博弈论模型和有盟主网络组织的博弈论模型，详细研究了网络组织的协调机制，然后给出了网络组织协调机制的解决方案；第六章作为网络组织协调机制的重要组成部分，本章在讨论了网络组织中建立信任机制的必要性的基础上，研究了网络组织信任关系的类型，提出了在网络组织中如何建立信任机制。

Do you know, i need you to come back

你知道吗，我需要你回来

Yang yinshu、Wang xiangsheng、Li decang,The first discovery of haemaphysalis conicinna.

1〕 杨银书，王祥生，李德昌。安徽省首次发现嗜群血蜱。