分散经营者

First, the decentration of the shareholders cause the absence of the active investors, none is willing to implement the rights of the shareholders by representing other shareholders, the managers become the insiders to control the company.

股票期权制度作为一种有效的公司激励机制广受发达的市场经济国家所推崇，然而，在美国，成批登场的大公司财务造假丑闻却对这种制度提出了挑战，首先，股权过度分散导致维护公司利益的&积极股东&缺位，没有哪一家股东能够或愿意积极主动地代表股东对经营者行使所有者权利，公司经营者成为控制公司的&内部人&；其次，美国对股票期权的会计处理规定，股票期权的价值不计入公司成本，也为经营者造假提供了合法的便利；再次，中介机构为了自身的利益，不能保持绝对的独立性，成为公司造假的帮凶；另外，美国倡导自由经济，依靠行业自律和市场制衡来约束市场参与者的行为，一方面给经济繁荣带来了活力，同时也带来了巨大风险，如果没有严密的制度保障和严厉的打击及监管，谁也不会放弃低成本的&道德风险&所带来的好处。

But the peasant household market is small and weak, the majority growers are at the non-organization condition, the potential inter-bank issue and acceptance of drafts are thin, the bargaining position is low, The fruit farmer does not have the strength to contend with the external forces, in addition the individual organization defects, making scattered farmers and social market's contradictions become more and more prominent, farmers are difficult in increasing their incomes, unable to protect their own legitimate rights and interests.

而农户市场地位弱小，大多数果农处于无组织状态，势单力薄，谈判地位低，果农没有力量同外来的侵权行为相抗衡，加之个体生产经营者本身的组织缺陷，使得分散的果农与社会化的大市场的矛盾越来越突出，果农增收困难，无法保护自身的合法权益。

The main problem of interests'conflict under a distributed model is the agent cost arising from the power abuse in operation and the losses of shareholders. The problem is due to separating controlling power from the ownership.

在股权分散模式下公司治理的利益冲突问题主要表现为由于所有权与控制权的分离所引致的经营者权力滥用与股东权益受损的代理成本问题。

This one mode pays close attention to network credence foundation of the businessman very much.

这一模式非常关注商人的网络信用基础。

Cell morphology of bacterial ghost of Pasteurella multocida was observed by scanning electron microscopy and inactivation ratio was estimated by CFU analysi.

扫描电镜观察多杀性巴氏杆菌细菌幽灵和菌落形成单位评价遗传灭活率。