农民行为

According to the reasons of Lose land's peasantry and the abroad experience of resolving this problem, the third part brings forward some feasible measures and advice in the aspect of system of confiscating glebe, system of burgage, standardizing the deed of government, lose land's peasantry themselves' diathesis, service of employment and social security.

第二部分分析了造成失地农民问题产生的法律、制度、政策及失地农民自身的种种的原因，探讨了失地农民问题的症结所在。第三部分针对失地农民问题产生的原因，通过借鉴国外失地农民问题解决经验，笔者从征地制度、土地产权制度、规范政府行为、失地农民自身素质、社会就业服务和社会保障等方面提出了可行性解决方法和建议。

The results indicates that the protectors include central government, local government and fanner.

研究结果表明，我国耕地资源保障主体主要包括中央政府、地方政府和农民，在耕地资源数量安全保障方面，但中央政府的保障积极性仍最高，地方政府和农民均消极应对；各保障主体的权利、义务及其行为约束制度有助于规范我国耕地资源安全保障主体的行为。

The chapter is involved with the economic problem of land intensiveness.

是对土地保护进行成本效益分析，合理推断农民行为方式。

System space and survival law decided farms rational choice and restricted economic and social evolutive direction.

内容提要制度空间与生存逻辑决定着农民行为的理性选择，也制约着经济和社会的变革。

With regard to the control issue from the aspect of the political science, Chapter Seven takes the relationship between farmers of China's southwest region and the local government as the subject investigated, discussed the contradictions, conflicts and even intensification of interests occurred during the time of the tobacco monopoly control, and touches many incredible inharmonic phenomena occurred under the background of the monopoly control by the central government even in the undeveloped countryside. Such inharmonic phenomena made, of course, farmers who planted and/or sold tobacco be in hot water, which led to the economic rational resistance against the behaviours of the local government that made people work hard and wasted money for nothing.

第七章从管制的政治学角度以中国西南地区农民与当地政府的关系作为研究对象，探讨了发生在烟草专卖管制时期的利益和矛盾冲突甚至完全激化，触及了落后的农村地区同样是在中央政府的专卖管制下却产生了许多令人难以置信的不和谐现象，出现这种情形当然使种烟、卖烟的农民陷入了困境，进而采取了经济上理性的抵制方式来对抗当地政府的劳民伤财行为。

It is composed of 4 chapters. Chapter 5 analyzes the farmers" behavior. It explains the character and the influencing factors of the farmers" behavior Using the Von Newman Morgenstern Utility Model to analyze to the individual, it could be concluded that the farmers AI behavior are influenced by many factors and it need joint work to ensure the farmer to attend the AI.

第五章对农民的行为进行了经济学分析，运用了经济学中的基本假设，分析了农业保险中农民行为的特点和影响农民行为的因素，通过冯·诺曼—摩根斯顿效用模型，对单个农民进行模拟分析后得出的理论结果与现实农民的行为不一致，从而得出结论：农民的农业保险行为受多种因素的影响，要保证农民的投保，是需要多方共同努力才能完成的。

But we must say that the rational factors are something unconspicuous in the process of farmers' choosing city jobs, in this case, rationality is rather a picture or hope.

实际上农民外出无论为了谋生存还是求发展，其行为的目的都是为了追求效益的最大化，但是在农民外出务工行为的选择过程中这种理性因素是以一种模糊的形式出现的，理性更多的是一种&图像&或者是展望。

But there exist many problems in technology cultivation,such as the farmers damands and cultivation disaccording, the wishes and actions disaccording, and 'lead heartful and farm carelessness'.

当前农民生产技能培训中存在农民的培训需求与培训内容未有效对接、农民的培训意愿与培训行为存在&鸿沟&、培训工作中经常出现&上热下冷&等问题。

At the same time, subjecting to the significant interference of external deviances, such as non-Bayesian rule, representative rule, anchoring effect, herd behavior and framing effect, farmer's non-rational choice, to a large extent, may dominate individual behavior and lead to risk preference.

同时，受非贝叶斯法则、代表性法则、锚定效应、从众行为和框架效应等的外界偏差性行为显著干扰的情况下，农民非理性选择很大程度上会主导个体的行为，农民极易出现风险偏好的倾向。

Through the analysis of the history,institution and game of Chinese farmer\'cooperative movement, we conclude that the farmer cooperative is the inevitable result of the institution change,and also is the equilibrium of the economic subjects\' behavior game.

二、论文的研究结论1、农民合作经济组织的产生是制度变迁的结果也是经济主体行为博弈的均衡通过对农民合作运动进程的历史分析，制度分析和博弈分析，可以知道，农民合作经济组织是制度变迁的必然结果，也是经济行为主体博弈的均衡。

Finally, according to market conditions and market products this article paper analyzes the trends in the development of camera technology, and designs a color night vision camera.

最后根据市场情况和市面上产品的情况分析了摄像机技术的发展趋势，并设计了一款彩色夜视摄像机。

Only person height weeds and the fierce looks stone idles were there.

只有半人深的荒草和龇牙咧嘴的神像。