查询词典 managers

From 1990s, with the use of Management Buy-outs by several enterprises in China, a lot of successful cases of MBO had let the economists, managers and policy-makers all concerned with this method. A MBO is a transaction that a group of managers buying a substantial amount of equity or asset in the firm for which they work. After that, the managers control the firm, change the equity and asset structure of the firm. It plays an important role in solving the property right problem of GOE and privately- owned enterprises and their lack of incentive mechanism in China.

进入90年代以来，随着管理层收购被我国一些企业采用，众多管理层收购案例的成功实施引起了中国经济界和企业界的强烈关注，管理层收购作为一种公司管理层购买本企业的股票或资产，以取得目标企业的控制权，从而改变公司所有权结构、控制权格局以及公司资产结构的制度安排方式对我国解决国有企业和民营企业产权不清问题，从而激励管理层提高企业业绩具有重要作用。

Compared to traditional incentives for managers, such as stock rights and bonus, incentive mechanism based on EVA can enable managers to think like shareholders, it can solve the problem on how to address the long-standing incentive issues of managers, and create more wealth for shareholders.

相对于传统的股权及奖金制激励方式，基于 EVA 的经营者激励机制能够使经营者像股东一样思考，解决了经营者的长效激励问题，能够为股东创造更多的财富。

The underlying reasons include: the government"s role in establishing a hospitable environment for the managers remains to be improved; the supervision on both capital market and managers" market is far from satisfied; the official standard of managers selection; lack of the manager-specific incentive and restraint mechanism; the vacancy of the restraint system by corporation owners and the ill-founded corporate governance structure, and so on.

究其原因有：国家关于企业经营者管理的大环境还有待于改善、资本市场和经理人市场的监督约束机制不完善、企业社会政策目标和效率目标的双重存在、企业经营者选拔任用标准"行政化"、企业经营者离岗后缺乏社会保障和制度化报酬、缺少针对企业经营者的有别于党政干部的激励与约束机制、所有者约束机制缺位，没有形成规范的公司治理结构。

This paper analyses the homogenous tendency of open-end fund at first,pointing out that unperfect development of market and investors' immature investment opinions is the origin of such phenomena. Secondly,having compared the fund sizes and purchase fee rates of 25 open-end funds in China,conclude that there are problems of diseconomy of scale and indistinctive relativity between fees and achievement in Chinese open-end funds. Then this paper introduces benefit and cost function to analyze the problem of lack of motivation and constrain mechanism towards fund managers because of unreasonable fees in China. Thirdly,this paper analyze funds managers' normal hazards by static game model,and then points out fund managers have serious tunneling behaviors in Chinese open-end fund industry. In the end,this paper analyzes the causes of liquidity risk of open-end fun and the particularity of liquidity risk of open-end fund in China,and concludes that liquidity risk in Chinese open-end fund industry is higher through calculating the rates of share change and comparing the portfolio selections of top 20 open-end funds in China.

本文首先分析了我国目前存在的基金产品同质化现象，指出市场发展的不完善以及投资者投资理念的不成熟是同质化的根源所在；其次对比了我国现有的25只开放式基金的规模和申购费率，得出了我国开放式基金存在着规模效应不明显以及基金业绩与费率相关性不强的问题，并引入效益函数和成本函数分析了由于我国开放式基金费率不合理引发的基金管理者激励约束机制缺失的问题；再次，应用静态博弈模型分析了基金管理人面临的道德风险，指出目前我国开放式基金由于监管机制脆弱而存在着较为严重的管理者利益输送行为；最后，分析了开放式基金流动性风险的形成原因以及我国基金市场流动性风险的特殊性，并通过计算目前我国基金资产规模前20位的开放式基金的份额变动率以及比较它们的投资组合结构，得出了目前我国开放式基金流动性风险偏大的结论。

INVESTMENT MANAGERS CLASSIFY FIRMS that have high ratios of book-to-market equity, earnings to price, or cash flow to price as value stocks. Fama and French (1992,1996) and Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) show that for U.S. stocks there is a strong value premium in average returns.

本研究对价值型个股与成长型个股的区别方式是透过 INVESTMENT MANAGERS CLASSIFY FIRMS 的定义，以股价净值比、本益比、或现金流量对价格比中，较低的个股定义为价值型个股，较高的则定义为成长型个股。

It has became the regardful focus to the enterprise owners and theorists that how to select a proper managers performance measurement indicator and set up the effective compensate incentive mechanism, so as to link up the incentive for managers with their performance, stimulate and restraint managers effectively, and reduce the conflicts between managers and stockholders.

如何选用合适的经营者业绩评价指标，建立有效的薪酬激励机制，把对经营者的激励与其真实的经营业绩挂钩，有效地激励和约束经营者，缓解经营者与股东之间的矛盾，这己成为企业所有者和理论界非常关心的问题，也是我国企业所有者对经营者激励的难点。

There exists the principal-agent relationship between stockholders and managers,which takes on different patterns under different conditions:under the condition of symmetric information,it displays as order-subordinate rela- tion ship,which need not incite managers while stockholders can pay managers regular fee by contract;under the con- dition of dissymmetric information,it displays as a fellowship,which need incite managers because managers may per- form according to the payment.

股东和经营管理者之间存在委托代理关系，这种委托代理关系在不同情况下具有不同的表现形式：在信息对称条件下，表现为命令和服从关系，此时无需对经营管理者进行激励，股东以&强制合同&的形式支付给经营管理者确定的报酬即可；在信息非对称条件下，委托代理关系表现为合伙关系，对经营管理者的激励相当重要，因为经营管理者会根据激励强度来付出劳动。

The purpose of this seminar is to help general managers, senior functional managers, and other nonfinancial managers make decisions that will measurably improve their personal effectiveness and the profitability of their organizations.

这次研讨会的目的是帮助总经理，高级职能经理，管理人员和其他非金融的决策，将显着地提高个人的效率和盈利能力的组织。

In fact, here are three really foolish goofs made by too many business, non-profit and association managers.If that's you, you foolishly do nothing positive about the behaviors of those important outside audiences of yours that most affect your operation.

事实上，这里有三个真的愚蠢粗心作出太多的商业，非营利和结社managers.if说的，你对教主什么也不做正面的态度行为的那些重要的观众外，你们认为最影响您的操作。

In business school, I was given no hint of the imperative's existence and I did not intuitively understand it when I entered the business world. I thought then that decent, intelligent, and experienced managers would automatically make rational business decisions. But I learned over time that isn't so. Instead, rationality frequently wilts when the institutional imperative comes into play.

Conversely， we do not wish to join with managers who lack admirable qualities， 38 在学校时没有人告诉我这种规范的存在，而我也不是一开始进入商业世界就知道有这回事，我以为任何正当，聪明有经验的经理人都会很自动的做这样的决策，但慢慢地我发现完全就不是这幺一回事，相反的理性的态度在系统规范的影响下都会慢慢地变质。

I am accused of being overreligious," she said in her quiet, frank manner,"but that does not prevent me thinking the children very cruel who obstinately commit such suicide.""

客人们在卡罗利娜·埃凯家里，举止就文雅一些，因为卡罗利娜的母亲治家很严厉。

Designed by French fashion house Herm è s, this elegant uniform was manufactured in our home, Hong Kong, and was the first without a hat.

由著名品牌 Herm è s 设计，这件高贵的制服是香港本土制造，是我们第一套不配帽子的制服。