- 更多网络例句与有限博弈相关的网络例句 [注：此内容来源于网络，仅供参考]
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In the mathematical equations to solve non-cooperative multi-dimensional nonlinear numerical approximation method is best for limited cooperation in the interests of the game in search of a new equilibrium.
在数学上解决多维非线性不合作方程组的最佳数值逼近方法就是争取有限合作，在博弈中寻求新的利益平衡点。
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The evolutionary game theory based on bounded rationality was used to set up an unsymmetrical replicator dynamics model for copetition relationship among the manufacturers on the cluster supply chains.
提出运用以有限理性为基础的演化博弈理论，建立和分析一个集群供应链的制造商之间竞合关系的非对称复制动态模型。
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Using the model of finite dynamic game and extended dynamic game, the paper establishes the optimal incentive system of land trust protection mechanism.
通过有限动态博弈模型与扩展的动态博弈模型，研究建立农村土地信托保护的最优激励机制。
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If there is a finite number of players and the action sets and the set of states are finite, then a stochastic game with a finite number of stages always has a Nash equilibrium.
如果随机博弈中参与者的数量有限并且每个博弈阶段可能的状态数量有限，那么一个具有有限博弈阶段的随机博弈一般都存在一个纳什均衡。
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Established stochastic model for user strategy selections to study the game with finite population. According to the expectation utilities of user, produced invasion and fixation rates to quantify selection pressure during the repeated games. Finally, detailed the effects of population size on selection scenario under fixed utility matrix through example.
通过建立网格使用者策略选择的随机模型来分析有限网格群体的博弈，并利用期望效用生成选择过程的量化指标来判断使用者在反复博弈中策略选择的变化方向及其稳定性。
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Vieille has shown that all two-person stochastic games with finite state and action spaces have approximate Nash equilibria when the total payoff is the limit inferior of the averages of the stage payoffs.
Vieille已经证明具有有限阶段和有限状态的两人随机博弈当中，如果博弈过程的报酬使用各个阶段报酬平均值的下限来计算的话，是具有逼近纳什均衡的。
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This paper mainly uses the tactics method of the evolutionary game namely replicator dynamics and the ESS under the boundedly rational conditions, with the hawk and pigeon model including the factor of power conflict , and case analysis method , which have carried on deep analysis to the course of the power conflict between the superior and the subordinate in company's political behavior, it draw superior with in what it is subordinate terms adopt tough offensive hawk strategy, adopt pigeon's strategy under some conditions , namely how to exercise one's own power.
本文主要用博弈论中进化博弈即有限理性条件下的复制动态和进化稳定策略方法，用加入权力冲突因素的鹰鸽博弈模型，以及案例分析的方法，对公司政治行为中上下级之间权力冲突的过程进行了深入的分析，得出了上司与下属在什么条件下采用强硬的进攻性的鹰战略，在什么条件下采用鸽战略，即如何行使各自的权力。
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there are short-term trade and long-term trade between supplier and buyer in the outsourcing. in this paper, the theory of repeated games is employed to discuss the quality for supplier and buyer under the different circumstances and the game model is set up.
在业务外包中，购买商和供应商有短期交易和长期合作，本文利用博弈论中的重复博弈理论，建立了博弈模型，并且在不同条件下讨论了购买商和供应商基于产品质量的有限次与无限次重复博弈。
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Based on the theory of technical innovation and technical innovation diffusion elaborated, as well as fluxionary calculus and game theory, the thesis analyses corporation adoption with game theory in the process of technical innovation diffusion: analyzes in the situation of information symmetry and information asymmetry the gambling between the supplies and the latent users of innovation, discusses the mechanism of the phenomenon "reversion choice" with emphasis in the situation of information asymmetry, and also introduces signal transmission model and information screen model to realize Pareto improvement; at the same time it analyzes in the situation of complete rationality and limited rationality the gambling between the latent users of innovation.
依据已阐述的技术创新和技术创新扩散理论，以及微积分、博弈论等相关理论，对技术创新扩散中企业采用行为进行了博弈分析：分析了信息对称和信息不对称情况下创新供给者与创新潜在采用企业之间的博弈，重点讨论了信息不对称时&逆向选择&现象发生的机理，并引入信号传递模型和信息甄别模型以实现帕累托改进；同时分析了完全理性和有限理性情况下创新潜在采用企业间的博弈。
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The first part discusses the affection of bounded rationality on rational foundation of the theory.The second part introduces the idea and framework of this theory,and the general 2*Mperson symmetric game and hawk*Mdove game and used as examples.The third part surveys the theory and practice value of evolutionary game theory,and discusses its prosperity of developement.
文章第一部分讨论了有限理性对博弈论理性基础的影响；第二部分介绍了进化博弈论的思想和分析框架，并以一般两人对称博弈和鹰鸽博弈为例作了具体讨论；第三部分对进化博弈论的理论和应用价值，以及进化博弈论的发展前景作了总结和讨论。
- 更多网络解释与有限博弈相关的网络解释 [注：此内容来源于网络，仅供参考]
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computable：可计算的
另外,博弈者的有限理性使得他所分析处理的对象应该首先是可计算的(computable),其次,应该是计算复杂性(computational complexity)程度受到限制的. 第二个也是我们研究的重点是激励(incentive)问题. 正如梅耶森(Myerson, 1985,
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preference：偏好
也就是说,这一中立政策严格限定在中国和印度的战略博弈情境中,脱离"中国因素"的领域允许存在"偏好"(preference)和"有限"(Limitedneutrality). 严格的中立政策对中国也是最为有利的,能够使中国在中印尼的三角关系中处于优势,
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Adam Brandenburger, Amanda Friedenberg, H. Jerome Keisler：《博弈中的入场资格>
<<预见遗憾:为什么选择越少越好>> Todd Sarv... | <<博弈中的入场资格>> Adam Brandenburger, Amanda Friedenberg, H. Jerome Keisler | <<有限理性与策略性互动:策略环境对名义惯性的影响>> Ernst Fehr, Jean-Robert...
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Bounded-recall reputations：有限回忆的声誉
Bilateral asymmetric information 双边非对称信息 | Bounded-recall reputations 有限回忆的声誉 | Capital-accumulation games 资本积累博弈